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Introduction
A series of federal government mandates requires residential mortgage lenders to
provide equal services to those ethnic and racial minority groups residing within their
service areas.1 As enforcement of these requirements became increasingly aggressive,
interest in unlawful loan discrimination issues rose. Of particular interest to this paper is
the Community Reinvestment Act’s (CRA) requirement that mortgage lenders provide
their regulatory agencies with borrowers’ characteristics. For analyses of these
requirements, see Bradbury, Case and Dunham (1989) or Holmes and Horvitz (1994).
Whether or not individual ﬁnancial institutions actually practice discrimination, the
effects of anti-discrimination regulation warrant examination. This type of lending bias
will presumably result in an inefﬁcient allocation of mortgage funds. While regulators
measure a lender’s adherence to established standards, the costs and beneﬁts of
noncompliance are less apparent. If mortgage lenders fail to adhere to established
regulations, costs associated with noncompliance should be reﬂected in stock prices. This
study investigates the impact of regulatory enforcement announcements on lending ﬁrms’
market values.
If noncompliance brings negative stock returns, regulatory enforcement actions should
inﬂuence management’s loan origination policies. For example, if failure to follow fair-
lending guidelines lowers the probability of a favorable ruling by regulators, or reduces
the ﬁrm’s market value, managers should increase their compliance efforts. Increased
managerial compliance efforts will likely impact the allocation of loanable funds,
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Abstract. Regulation of real estate lending has substantially increased in the past decade.
Government efforts to improve compliance with Community Reinvestment Act mandates
are evidence of increased emphasis on racial equal opportunity in loan origination. To
investigate the impact of these efforts, this paper examines the Federal Reserve Bank
rejection of Shawmut National Corporation’s application to buy New Dartmouth Bank.
Rejection was based on Shawmut’s poor compliance with fair-lending guidelines. Testing
ﬁnds signiﬁcant negative abnormal stock returns for samples of mortgage lenders on the
announcement day of Shawmut’s application rejection. In addition, cross-sectional analysis
reveals an inverse relationship between national banks’ cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) and a measure of fair lending.presumably beneﬁtting minority borrowers. The effect of any such reallocation of
loanable funds on proﬁtability is unclear. If compliance costs are high, these are likely to
reduce ﬁrm proﬁtability and thereby reduce stock prices.
This paper estimates the impact on the stock price performance of mortgage lenders
and on other ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial services industry when the Federal Reserve Board
denied Shawmut National Corporation’s application to acquire New Dartmouth Bank of
Manchester, New Hampshire.2 Negative abnormal returns will indicate that investors
believe that lenders have not adhered to fair-lending guidelines and that either the
resulting penalties will be signiﬁcant or compliance will entail signiﬁcant costs. Variation
in the size and signiﬁcance of abnormal returns associated with the Shawmut denial
will reﬂect both investors’ perceptions of the severity of lending discrimination and
differences in the costs of achieving compliance with fair-lending guidelines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces speciﬁc
regulatory actions related to fair-lending and compliance issues. Section three reviews
related literature. The fourth section sets forth the methodology and data, and identiﬁes
variables likely to affect market valuation. Section ﬁve presents the results. Section six
concludes the paper.
The Regulatory Setting
On November 15, 1993, the Federal Reserve Board’s regulatory compliance division
denied Shawmut’s application to acquire New Dartmouth Bank. According to the
American Banker, ‘‘the action was the ﬁrst denial by the (Federal Reserve) because of
concerns about the handling of fair-lending issues by a bank’s management.’’3 This
announcement produced uncertainty among the stock prices of banks involved in
residential mortgage lending and those banking organizations that engaged in takeover
activities (News Roundup, November 17, 1993).4
Announcement of the Federal Reserve decision might impact banking organizations’
stock returns in any of several ways. One possibility is that investors would ﬁnd little
relevant information in the application denial. This interpretation by investors may be
revealed by the absence of any signiﬁcant stock price reaction.5 Such a ﬁnding would
suggest that for many ﬁrms the costs of compliance are low or that the majority of ﬁrms
already comply with fair-lending guidelines. If lenders are already in compliance with
fair-lending guidelines, then the Shawmut denial is likely to be an isolated incident, with
small costs to other lenders and relatively little change in lending practices. Given the
media attention to the announcement, this result seems unlikely.6
Alternatively, investors may regard the denial as signaling increased enforcement of
regulations affecting mortgage and consumer loan practices and, at a minimum,
increased costs of compliance with equal opportunity guidelines. If lenders are not in
compliance with these regulations, the Federal Reserve decision suggests that ﬁrms will
ﬁnd that previously available proﬁtable opportunities are no longer permitted. Mortgage
and consumer loans will become more available to targeted groups in an effort to comply
with fair-lending regulations. Signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns for residential
mortgage and consumer lenders would suggest this interpretation.
Many banking organizations are potentially affected by equal credit opportunity
legislation and the Federal Reserve decision.7 While Federal Reserve responsibility for
enforcing fair-lending mandates extends to consumer ﬁnance companies, savings and
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The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)
requires all state and national banks and S&Ls to maintain reserve deposits with the
Federal Reserve. However, the Federal Reserve has direct regulatory control of bank
holding companies (BHCs), and national banks must be members of the Federal Reserve
System (state banks have no such membership requirement). Thus, while all consumer
lenders are subject to Federal Reserve fair-lending enforcement policies, BHCs with
national bank subsidiaries are most likely to be impacted by the Federal Reserve
announcement.
The 1989 Mortgage Disclosure Act, the CRA of 1977, and the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1991 (FIRREA) all require the recording and
public reporting of consumer mortgage lenders’ equal-opportunity lending compliance
data.9 A ﬁnancial institution’s CRA rating is a common indicator of equal-opportunity
mandate compliance. Therefore, a low CRA rating (indicating poor compliance) would
likely result in a signiﬁcant negative stock market reaction in the event that the Federal
Reserve moved to stricter enforcement of equal opportunity regulations. Thus, an
institution’s history of fair-lending compliance should inﬂuence the impact of the Federal
Reserve Board’s decision on each ﬁrm’s stock price.
Literature Review
Studies of market reactions to announcements of regulation changes in mortgage
lenders and other ﬁnancial institutions are common. Some examples include Eisenbeis,
Harris and Lakonishok (1984), who identify signiﬁcant and positive abnormal returns
when one-bank holding companies are formed.10 Black, Fields and Schweitzer (1990)
ﬁnd that legislation that provides increased opportunities for interstate expansion has a
positive impact on regional bank stock prices. Money center banks did not immediately
beneﬁt from the legislative changes and were found to have negative returns. Billingsley
and Lamy (1992) ﬁnd positive stock price reactions to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1985
conﬁrming the legality of regional reciprocal interstate banking pacts. Each of the studies
presents evidence that supports the hypothesis that a ﬁnancial institution’s opportunity to
diversify is valuable.
Cooper, Kolari and Wagster (1991) ﬁnd generally negative stock returns for large
international banks in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Japan when the 1988 Basle Accord
was adopted.11 The Basle Accord ‘‘was intended to raise the capital bases of banks
actively operating across national borders . . . .’’ (Cooper et al., p. 367). This agreement
presumably reduces the proﬁtability of international banking organizations which are
expected to reduce their asset portfolio risk or to increase their capital base. In either
case, these banks’ lending opportunities will be curtailed.
Several recent studies relate directly to the Shawmut ruling in that they examine the
market response among ﬁnancial institutions following congressional legislation passage.
These acts and studies include:
(1) the Depository Institutions Act of 1982,12 which is examined by Fraser and Kolari
(1990), Millon-Cornett and Tehranian (1990), and Fraser, Richards and Fosberg
(1985). Fraser and Kolari ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant returns for S&Ls prior to the
Act’s passage. Millon-Cornett and Tehranian ﬁnd positive returns for owners of
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banks generally experienced negative returns. Fraser, Richards and Fosberg ﬁnd
that S&L deposit rate deregulation had signiﬁcant negative effects on stock prices
of regional, regional wholesale and regional retail banks, while money center
banks were not affected.
(2) effects of DIDMCA on stock prices, which are examined by Allen and Wilhelm
(1988), Aharony, Saunders and Swary (1988), and Millon-Cornett and Tehranian
(1989). These studies ﬁnd considerable evidence of differences across types of
ﬁnancial institutions in both the size and direction of stock price movements
associated with passage of DIDMCA.
(3) the impact of FIRREA on stock prices, which is studied by Sundaram, Rangan
and Davidson (1992) who ﬁnd positive returns for both banks and S&Ls. Madura,
Tucker and Zarruk (1993) ﬁnd positive returns for S&Ls, but only a negligible
effect on commercial bank stock prices.
These articles relate to the current study in two important ways. First, they examine the
market reaction to regulatory actions, as does this work. Second, they ﬁnd differences in
the response of various types and sizes of ﬁnancial institutions to regulatory change.
Examining the impact of a change in the willingness of regulators to base acquisition
approval on the applicant’s fair-lending compliance record is a logical extension of the
literature.
Model and Data
As discussed above, effects of regulatory and legislative changes on stock prices have
been shown to vary according to the type and size of lending institution. Investors have
better access to a variety of information about large ﬁrms, which likely includes their
fair-lending records. Generally, less information is available about smaller ﬁnancial
institutions, so investors may not know about their equal-opportunity compliance
history. Thus, smaller banks’ stock price reaction to the Shawmut denial will probably be
less than large ﬁrms’ stock price changes. Differences in the regulatory environment, as
discussed in section two of this paper, are also likely to impact responses to the Federal
Reserve decision. The effects of Federal Reserve denial of Shawmut’s application should
vary with ﬁrm type and size. Discussion of other variables expected to be correlated with
stock price reactions to the Federal Reserve decision follows.
A ﬁrm’s history of merger activity is likely to be positively correlated with that ﬁrm’s
future involvement in merger and acquisition activities. Stricter Federal Reserve
veriﬁcation of equal opportunity regulation compliance appears to be a requirement for
takeover approval. Past approval may serve as indirect validation of the lender’s
compliance record. Should an institution decide to become involved in additional take-
over activities, subsequent approvals would seem more likely given a record of merger
application approval. Firms interested in subsequent mergers allegedly will ﬁnd the
application process easier because the Federal Reserve has already veriﬁed their fair-
lending compliance. These ﬁnancial institutions should be less affected by the Federal
Reserve compliance decision.13
As noted above, Federal Reserve denial of Shawmut’s application was based on
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lending performance record is expected to inﬂuence the impact of the decision on stock
prices. Firms with weak records of compliance may ﬁnd that regulatory examinations will
become more onerous, and these ﬁrms will be less likely to ﬁnd the Federal Reserve
willing to approve applications. Such ﬁrms are expected to experience larger negative
stock price reactions to the Shawmut decision than are ﬁrms with strong compliance
records.
Finally, the number of opportunities available to the Federal Reserve to evaluate a
ﬁrm’s compliance efforts will increase with the number of actions currently under review
by the Federal Reserve. At the time of the Shawmut ruling, several merger applications
were in earlier stages of review. The denial decision would likely be associated with a
negative reaction among those ﬁrms with pending applications. As a result, the impact of
the Federal Reserve decision on stock prices is expected to increase with the number of
applications pending at the Federal Reserve.
Standard event study methodology is used to measure abnormal returns surrounding
the November 15, 1993 Federal Reserve decision. Three other related dates are also
examined. Exhibit 1 provides the primary and secondary event dates and several other
relevant events.
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Exhibit 1
Examined Event Dates
Date Publication Event
10/9/93 AB Article states that lending bias probe is clouding Shawmut’s pending
acquisitions
10/22/93 AB Shawmut listed as one of banks being probed by Justice Department
for lending bias
11/15/93 Federal Reserve votes 3–3 on Shawmut’s acquisition of New Dartmouth
Bank (thus not approved)
12/14/93 AB Shawmut settles Justice Department suit for $1M
(Other dates of possible interest, but not examined)
1/22/93 AB Shawmut announces commitment of $50M to a minority lending
program
2/26/93 AB Investigators obtain lending bias data from Shawmut
3/10/93 AB Shawmut conﬁrms that it is subject of lending bias probe by the
Justice Department
11/17/93 WSJ, AB Articles provide analysis of Federal Reserve’s surprising ‘‘get tough’’
policy in turning down Shawmut’s application
1/10/94 AB Federal Reserve agrees to give Shawmut more time to seek rehearing
to acquire New Dartmouth Bank
3/9/94 WSJ Shawmut announces agreement to acquire West Newton Savings Bank
4/29/94 WSJ Federal Reserve clears application to acquire New Dartmouth Bank
(reversing earlier course)
AB5American Banker; WSJ5Wall Street Journal.The following standard event study model is estimated:14
Rjt=aj1b1j(Rmt)1ejt . (1)
The expected daily return for each security is computed by observing market behavior
for 1992. This regression of security and market returns is used to estimate aj and b1j.
The Brown and Warner (1985) procedure is used to analyze the effects of the Federal
Reserve denial of Shawmut’s merger application by examining the daily abnormal returns
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding the four events listed in Exhibit 1.15
The Dodd and Warner (1983) method is used to calculate the standardized abnormal
returns and Z-statistics. Abnormal changes in stock prices would suggest that the four
events altered investor expectations about the stock prices of banking organizations.16
Next, the following model is used to examine the inﬂuence of the Federal Reserve
announcement and other factors on CARs:
CARjt5aj1b1j(EOCRi)1b2j(FEDi)1b3j(MERGEi)1b4j(TAi)1ejt . (2)
Since the Equal Opportunity Credit Rating for each mortgage lender (EOCRi) is a
qualitative variable, such as ‘‘satisfactory’’ or ‘‘outstanding,’’ the ‘‘Black-to-White
rejection ratio,’’ which has been reported in the popular press and cited as evidence of
compliance with equal-lending opportunity guidelines by mortgage lenders, has been
used as a proxy for each ﬁrm’s EOCR.17 In addition, the 1989 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act requires lenders to ﬁle their Black-to-White rejection ratio with federal
regulators. The model alternately includes 1991 values (EOCR91) and 1992 values
(EOCR92) for each ﬁrm.18 b1j is expected to be negative since the Federal Reserve
announcement is expected to reduce the number of merger opportunities available to
lenders with poor fair-lending compliance records.
For each BHC, the variable FEDi represents the number of acquisition (or other)
applications pending before the Federal Reserve around the time of the Shawmut
decision.19 These data are found in the Federal Reserve Bulletin’s ‘‘Legal Developments’’
section for the six months (FED06) and twelve months (FED12) following the Shawmut
decision. FED06 and FED12 should indicate the number of examinations of lending
policies that could be affected by the change in enforcement policy. The coefﬁcient b2j is
expected to be negative because the Shawmut decision is likely to affect adversely those
lenders that are currently under regulatory scrutiny.
MERGEi is a dummy variable measuring merger activity. The variable is considered
under two scenarios. First, the variable MERGE05 has a value of 1 only if the lender has
consummated ﬁve or more mergers or acquisitions in the preceding ﬁve years. The model
is run again with the variable MERGE10, with a value of 1 if the lender has had ten or
more mergers or acquisitions within the past ten years.20 A negative value of b3j would
verify that those lenders involved in merger activities will be most affected by the new
approach to enforcement. A positive value for b3j would imply that investors believe that
those lenders who have previously survived a Federal Reserve compliance audit would
likely be approved.
TAi, the natural logarithm of each lender’s 1992 total assets21 (as found in Compact
Disclosure) is included as a proxy for ﬁrm size. b4j is expected to be positive because
investors should have less uncertainty about the fair-lending compliance of larger and
better known ﬁnancial institutions.
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which data are available in both Karr (1993) and the Media General daily prices ﬁle.
Subgroups include the ﬁnancial institution subsidiaries of manufacturing ﬁrms,22 thrifts
(SIC 6035), or BHCs (SIC 6712). BHCs are further segmented by these three
classiﬁcations: state banks (SIC 6021), national banks (SIC 6022), or dual (SIC codes
6021 and 6022).
As discussed above, expected stock market reaction to the Shawmut decision will be
most negative for those lenders under the direct control and supervision of the Federal
Reserve. Thus, BHCs with national bank subsidiaries will be the ones most likely to
experience signiﬁcant and negative stock market responses.
Karr (1993) examines 786 separate ﬁnancial institutions or subsidiaries. In the current
analysis, 255 of the subsidiary lenders could not be positively associated with a parent
ﬁrm.23 There are 201 distinct parent organizations; no ticker symbol match was found for
19. A total of 45 ﬁrms are either no longer listed (having been acquired) or otherwise not
found in the Media General ﬁles. The ﬁnal sample size for estimation using model (2) is
137.24 Exhibit 2 presents descriptive data for the entire sample and the various subgroups.
The number of ﬁrms in the subgroups ranges from nine (Finance companies) to eighty-
two (BHCs). Mean total assets range from $4.95B (for BHCs that own state banks) to
$39.70B (manufacturing ﬁrms with ﬁnancial institutions).
Results
Exhibit 3 contains the event study results based on equation (1). These results are
presented for the entire sample and for each of the subgroups. The negative excess return
on the compliance decision announcement date (November 15, 1993) for the entire group
of Bank Holding Companies (signiﬁcant at the .01 level) and for each of the subcategories
(signiﬁcant at the .10 level or better) is important to note. Also noteworthy is the negative
cumulative excess return when all ﬁrms in the study group are considered (signiﬁcant at
the .01 level), for the entire group of BHCs (signiﬁcant at the .05 level), and for each of
the individual bank categories.
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Exhibit 2
Descriptive Statistics1
Mean Minimum Maximum
Firm Type N Total Assets Total Assets Total Assets
BHCs 82 $24.738B $.227B $213.701B
National 20 21.835B .351B 118.059B
State 15 4.950B .227B 40.910B
Dual2 47 32.288B .706B 213.701B
S&L 27 6.430B .144B 48.141B
Finance Co. 9 21.269B .164B 149.118B
Manufacturing 19 39.705B .049B 192.876B
All Data 137 $22.977B $.049B $213.701B
11992 data
2‘‘Dual’’ refers to BHCs with both state and national bank subsidiaries.We ﬁnd it interesting that the group of S&Ls also has an event day and cumulative
abnormal return that is negative and signiﬁcant at the .05 level. The two remaining
groups (‘‘Other’’ Financial Institutions and Manufacturing Companies with Financial
Institution Subsidiaries) have mixed excess and cumulative excess returns results that
might be attributed to the small number of ﬁrms included in these categories.25
Exhibit 4 reports the results based on equation (2) for the announcement date,
November 15, 1993. Panel A reports the ﬁndings of the analysis using 1991 fair-lending
data while Panel B reports the results using 1992 fair-lending data. The CARs of BHCs
with only national bank subsidiaries are signiﬁcantly negatively related to their 1991 fair-
lending compliance proxy. Thus, the anouncement affected most those lenders over
which the Federal Reserve has the most extensive regulatory oversight. The positive,
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of MERGE05 for BHCs with only national bank subsidiaries
implies that investors believe that recent merger activity veriﬁes the BHCs’ compliance
with equal-opportunity lending mandates and suggests approval of subsequent
acquisitions is likely.26 Signiﬁcance of other coefﬁcient estimates is scattered and limited.
So, while it appears that the stock prices of ﬁrms in several sectors of the ﬁnancial
services industry were affected adversely by the Federal Reserve Shawmut decision, there
may be factors not yet identiﬁed that play a role in determining the strength of the stock
market response to the announcement.
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Exhibit 3
Results of Event Study: Daily Abnormal Returns and
Three-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns1
(using the Model: Rjt5aj1b1j(Rmt)1ejt)
Date
Institutions Nov 12 Nov 15 Nov 16 CAR
BHC-National Banks .0010 2.0080 .0030 2.0040
(.26) (21.95*) (.85) (2.73)
BHC-State Banks .0026 2.0123 .0036 2.0061
(.37) (23.01***) (.65) (2.69)
BHC-Dual2 .0003 2.0057 2.0012 2.0066
(.15) (22.56***) (2.59) (21.97*)
BHC-All .0009 2.0075 .0007 2.0059
(.45) (24.18***) (.39) (22.09**)
S&L 2.0013 2.0071 2.0018 2.0102
(2.32) (22.39**) (2.45) (22.30**)
Finance Co. 2.0071 .0025 2.0118 2.0021
(.72) (.22) (21.55) (2.14)
Manufacturing Co. .0081 2.0020 .0101 .0163
(1.90*) (2.49) (1.90*) (1.69)
All Firms .0019 2.0060 .0007 2.0034
(1.11) (23.90***) (1.43) (21.32)
1t-statistics are in parentheses.
2‘‘Dual’’ refers to BHCs with both state and national bank subsidiaries.
*, **, *** indicate that the coefﬁcient estimate is signiﬁcant at the a 5.1, a 5.05, a 5.01 level of
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Exhibit 4
Regression Results from the Following General Model 
and the Event Date of November 15, 1994:
CARjt5aj1b1j(EOCRi)1b2j(FEDi)1b3j(MRGRi)1b4j(lnTAi)1ejt
Panel A1
Alpha EOCR91 MERGE05 FED06 ln TA
BHC-National .0439 2.0118** .0255* 2.0019 2.0014
(N520, R25.32) (.0620) (.0053) (.0130) (.0033) (.0043)
BHC-State 2.3189* 2.0010 2.0054 2.0215 .0225*
(N515, R25.35) (.1568) (.0068) (.0209) (.0143) (.0116)
BHC-Dual2 .0282 2.0002 2.0095 2.0009 2.0015
(N547, R25.12) (.0465) (.0022) (.0070) (.0007) (.0028)
BHC-All 2.0160 .0002 2.0047 2.0011 .0009
(N582, R25.05) (.0-310) (.0019) (.0061) (.0008) (.0020)
S&L 2.0668 2.0002 2.0193 NA .0041
(N527, R25.07) (.0545) (.0022) (.0157) (.0037)
Finance Co. .0167 .0103 NA NA 2.0002
(N59, R25.17) (.1367) (.0106) (.0088)
Manufacturing .0183 .0014 NA NA 2.0002
(N519, R22.003) (.0688) (.0070) (.0044)
All 2.0150 2.0004 2.0081 2.0011 .0011
(N5137, R25.04) (.0239) (.0015) (.0063) (.0009) (.0015)
Panel B
Alpha EOCR92 MERGE05 FED06 ln TA
BHC-National .0609 2.0035 .0120 2.0005 2.0038
(N520, R25.13) (.0696) (.0044) (.0132) (.0046) (.0046)
BHC-State 2.3030* .0020 2.0073 2.0212 .0209*
(N515, R25.36) (.1335) (.0055) (.0195) (.0136) (.0095)
BHC-Dual .0249 .0002 2.0092 2.0009 2.0014
(N547, R25.12) (.0482) (.0014) (.0071) (.0007) (.0028)
BHC-All 21.0174 .0005 2.0045 2.0012 .0009
(N582, R22.05) (.0312) (.0013) (.0060) (.0008) (.0020)
S&L 2.0682 .0003 2.0189 NA .0041
(N527, R25.07) (.0533) (.0013) (.0154) (.0037)
Finance Co. .0665 2.0012 NA NA 2.0044
(N59, R25.04) (.1371) (.0223) (.0101)
Manufacturing 2.0048 .0137 NA NA 2.0007
(N519, R25.13) (.0662) (.0090) (.0041)
All 2.0167 .0004 2.0081 2.0011 .0010
(N5137, R22.04) (.0238) (.0011) (.0063) (.0009) (.0015)
1Standard errors appear in parentheses below each coefﬁcient estimate.
2‘‘Dual’’ refers to BHCs with both state and national bank subsidiaries.
*, ** indicate the coefﬁcient estimate is signiﬁcant at the a5.1, a5.05 level.Equation 2 reveals no signiﬁcant relationships between CARs and independent
variables for BHCs with both state bank subsidiaries and national bank subsidiaries.
However, as expected, both EOCR and FED have negative signs. The CARs of the
remaining ﬁnancial institutions—S&Ls, ﬁnance companies, and manufacturing ﬁrms
with mortgage lending subsidiaries—show no signiﬁcant relation to these variables.
There is also no signiﬁcant relationship between CARs and these variables when the
entire dataset is examined.
The results from equation 2 for BHCs that own only state banks are also of interest.
The signiﬁcant and negative intercept means that these banks’ CARs show an overall
negative reaction to the Federal Reserve decision. This reaction is mitigated by ﬁrm size,
as shown by the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient for the natural log of total assets (lnTA).
Concluding Remarks and Summary
This analysis ﬁnds that the stock returns of many mortgage lending organizations
reacted negatively to the Federal Reserve denial of Shawmut National Corporation’s
acquisition request. For the ﬁrst time, a denial decision was based on the failure of a
mortgage lender to comply adequately with federal fair-lending mandates. There is a
signiﬁcant negative excess return on the decision announcement date and a signiﬁcant
three-day cumulative abnormal return among all bank holding companies. This decision
and associated market reaction reveal much about the importance of new directions in
equal-opportunity lending compliance enforcement to investors and lenders.
Cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between the CAR and measures of fair-
lending compliance, the number of pending requests, and the number of previously
approved merger applications are all signiﬁcantly correlated with investor (and
stockholder) reaction to the Shawmut merger application denial. In both the event study
and cross-sectional analyses, the strongest reaction was among the Bank Holding
Companies and, in particular, those BHCs with national bank subsidiaries.
The results reported here identify a stock market response to a Federal Reserve
regulatory action. If these results may be generalized to other regulatory and legislative
actions, they suggest that changes in regulation of ﬁnancial services ﬁrms is likely to have
a signiﬁcant impact on their stock price performance. While it is difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to predict the outcome of efforts to increase or decrease regulation of
ﬁnancial services, changes in both the enforcement of existing regulations and in the
regulations themselves warrant the attention of investors.
Notes
1The 1989 Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, and the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1991 all regulate consumer mortgage
lending practices.
2The Federal Reserve Board of Governors voted 3–3 with one abstention on the matter. As such,
Shawmut’s request could more accurately be described as ‘‘not approved.’’
3Cummins (1993), p. 3.
4The Cummins (1993) article includes this quotation from an unidentiﬁed industry source: ‘‘The
rules have changed. The bar has been raised, but nobody knows how high.’’ Also, from the Wall
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VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, 1996Street Journal (News Roundup, 1993) there is this quotation regarding acquisition planning
following the Federal Reserve’s ruling: ‘‘You can plan for anything, if you know what the rules are.
It’s when you don’t know what the rules are that makes it so difﬁcult.’’
5It is possible that the Federal Reserve’s announcement could alter the variance of stock price
returns along with or instead of the returns themselves. That issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
6However, statistically insigniﬁcant reactions are possible if the economic effects from the Federal
Reserve’s decision are expected to be small relative to current market values.
7Fair-lending data are available only for home mortgage and home equity loans on a nationwide
basis. Thus, while all consumer lenders may be appropriate subjects, only consumer mortgage
lenders are examined.
8Credit unions are currently exempt from the CRA (Lacker, 1995). In addition, while credit unions
may be affected by the Federal Reserve’s decision these institutions have no publicly traded stock;
therefore, credit unions are excluded from the study.
9No such uniform requirements exist for other consumer credit providers although Congress is in
the preliminary stages of considering such legislation.
10At the time of the announcements under study, one-bank holding companies had greater
opportunities to diversify geographically and increase their product offers than did multi-bank
holding companies.
11The Basle Accord provided for adoption of risk-based capital requirements by banks in twelve
leading Western industrialized countries.
12The Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which is often referred to as the Garn-St Germain Act
or the Garn Bill, reduced restrictions on S&Ls’ loan portfolios and permitted S&Ls and
commercial banks to offer deposit instruments competitive with money market mutual funds.
13A bank that is regarded as obtaining its strength and growth through acquisitions can meet with
stock market skepticism if it is forced to abandon that strategy. A case in point is the reaction to
Banc One’s announcement (February 1994) that it is not going to go through with a stock trans-
action to acquire FirsTier Financial Inc. of Nebraska. This announcement signals the end of Banc
One’s acquisition policy and has produced ‘‘jitters among some investors’’ (Stern and Pulliam, 1994).
14Where Rjt is the rate of return on stock j over period t; Rmt is the return on the market portfolio
for period t proxied by the CRSP value-weighted returns index; aj is the intercept term for ﬁrm j;
b1j is the slope measuring systematic risk sensitivity for ﬁrm j; and ejt is the unsystematic component
of ﬁrm j’s return for period t (the usual ordinary least squares assumptions are assumed to hold).
15Only the results of the reaction to the November 15, 1993 announcement are presented. Results
for the other dates are available upon request.
16This study incorporates several alternate statistical methods for beta estimation in analysis
involving a common event date. For a detailed discussion of an appropriate approach for this type
of analysis, see Henderson (1990) or Shelor and Cross (1994).
17See, for example, Karr (1993) and Bacon (1994).
18Data from 1992 were not reported in the same format as the 1991 data until after the Federal
Reserve had announced its Shawmut decision.
19Other applications pending before the Federal Reserve might include bank expansions, new
branches, or relocations.
20Merger and acquisition histories are obtained from Moody’s Banking and Finance Manual. Only
the results from MERGE05 are reported. The number of mergers and acquisitions in which each
ﬁrm was involved during the preceding ten-year period was also used and obtained results that are
similar to those reported here. The choice to report the results for the models including the dummy
variable MERGE05 is intended to focus on the impact of the Federal Reserve ruling on ﬁrms
known to be actively involved in mergers and acquisitions.
21The natural logarithm of ﬁrm’s assets reduces size-related heteroskedasticity and provides a
reasonable measure of each ﬁrm’s scale of operations. Similar results are found when the model is
estimated using total assets in place of the log of assets.
MORTGAGE LENDERS’ MARKET RESPONSE 6722Given that many of the banking organizations reported by Karr are subsidiaries of industrial
ﬁrms, the authors identify the industry classiﬁcation of the parent corporations. Finance
subsidiaries of predominantly non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are included in Karr (1993). However, it is
doubtful that the Federal Reserve’s decision will have much impact on the stock price of ﬁrms such
as Ford, General Electric, or Sears. Also, there are no data for these ﬁrms for the MERGE and
FED variables.
23There are 209 distinct ﬁrms in the 255 observations.
24The exact number of ﬁrms used in estimating equation 2 differs based on the proxies used for
each variable. The number of observations for each regression is reported below each category in
Exhibit 4.
25Cumulative abnormal returns and excess returns for the event analyses of the other relevant dates
in the Shawmut case are mixed and/or insigniﬁcant and are not reported here. The results for the
event dates not reported here are available from the authors upon request.
26Another interpretation of the result is that the Federal Reserve’s decision will slow down future
acquisitions. Past studies of bank mergers have generally found that acquiring banks earn negative,
but not signiﬁcant, abnormal returns. See Cornett and De (1991), Desai and Stover (1985), James
and Wier (1987), and Trifts and Scanlon (1986) for representative work on this topic.
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